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Abstract
This paper explores for the first time the consequences of fiscal limitations
on the estimation of local tax reaction functions. We focus on the frequently
encountered case of local tax caps and compare four empirical approaches: 1)
the spatial lag specification that does not account for corner solutions at the
tax limits; 2) a Bayesian spatial approach for censored dependent variables;
3) a Tobit model augmented with a spatial lag; 4) a spatial discrete hazard
model. The evidence arising from an investigation of severely state-constrained
local vehicle taxes in Italy suggests that ignoring tax limitations can lead to
substantial underestimation of inter-jurisdictional fiscal interaction.
JEL classification: C23; C24; H71.
Key words: tax limitations; tax reaction function; spatial auto-correlation.
∗EQUIPPE, Université des Sciences et Technologies de Lille 1, Faculté des Sci-
ences Economiques et Sociales, 59655 Villeneuve d’Ascq Cedex (France); e-mail:
edoardo.diporto@univ-lille1.fr.
†Corresponding author. Department of Economics, University of Torino, Via Po 53, 10124
Turin (Italy); e-mail: federico.revelli@unito.it.
1
1 Introduction
The nature of central-local relationships in M-form (multi-divisional form) pub-
lic sector structures plays a crucial role in determining the observed degree of
tax and public expenditure decentralization and the actual extent of local fis-
cal autonomy (Maskin et al. [27]). As documented in Joumard and Kongsrud
[20] and Sutherland et al. [37], most OECD country governments exercise their
command by imposing lower and/or upper limits on local tax rates or by man-
dating types and levels of expenditures on local public services, and forty-six
of the US states place restrictions on local property taxes (Calabrese and Ep-
ple [7]).1 Overall, the examples of local tax limitations around the world are
countless.2
The issue of mandating and capping on decentralized fiscal policies has at-
tracted considerable interest in the theoretical and empirical public economics
literature. Cremer and Palfrey [9] formally model the genesis of central man-
dates in federal systems, and Nechyba [29], Vigdor [39] and Calabrese and Epple
[7] investigate origins and political support for tax limitations. Wang [40] and
Konrad [22] discuss the consequences of minimum tax rates in theoretical mod-
els of commodity and capital income tax competition respectively, while most of
the empirical literature concerns the impact of tax and expenditure limitations
on policy outcomes in the US states (Figlio [14], Downes et al. [10], Dye et al.
[12]).
On the other hand, little attention has been devoted to the investigation
of the consequences of tax limitations on the empirical modelling of spatially
dependent local fiscal policies. Somewhat surprisingly, while it has long been
recognized that a key feature of decentralized fiscal policy-making is the interde-
pendence among decision-makers due to a variety of fiscal externalities (Brueck-
1Local property tax rate limitations in the US states date back as early as the 1930s, and
became widespread after California’s Proposition 13 in the late 1970s (Wolman et al. [41]).
2Local tax limitations are in place in virtually all European countries, most frequently
including local property taxes (for instance, the Impuesto sobre los bienes inmuebles in Spain
and the Grundsteuer in Germany) and local business taxes (as the Taxe professionelle in
France and the Imposta regionale sulle attività produttive in Italy).
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ner [5]), all of the existing empirical analyses of inter-jurisdictional competition
rest on the often implausible assumption that local decision-makers are actually
free to choose their preferred policies. In fact, in an early study of property
tax competition within the Boston metropolitan area, Brueckner and Saavedra
[6] highlighted the link between local tax limitations and the intensity of tax
competition. They pointed out that “reaction functions become flat once they
encounter the levy-limit constraint” (Brueckner and Saavedra [6], p. 220), and
acknowledged that “implementing this kind of double regime specification in
a spatial lag context appears difficult” (Brueckner and Saavedra [6], p. 220).
Focusing on the regime switch represented by the introduction of the local tax
limitation known as Proposition 212 , they found that the degree of spatial auto-
correlation in local property taxes was somewhat lower in the presence of the
tax cap.
This paper attempts at exploring for the first time the consequences of the
existence of tax limits on the modelling and estimation of a local fiscal policy
reaction function. In particular, we compare four empirical approaches to the
analysis of spatial auto-correlation in local tax policies: 1) the conventional
spatial lag specification that does not account for corner solutions at the tax
limits; 2) a Bayesian spatial approach for censored dependent variables; 3) a
Tobit model augmented with a spatial lag; 4) a spatial discrete hazard model
focusing on the discrete corner solution outcome.
While in general, and similarly to standard multivariate analysis of limited
dependent variables, the direction and size of the bias arising from ignoring tax
limitations are unknown a priori (Pudney [33]), the Brueckner and Saavedra
[6] intuition suggests that tax reaction functions become flat once authorities
hit the tax limit, thereby leading to underestimation of the degree of inter-
jurisdictional fiscal interaction when overlooking the constraint-induced corner
solutions.
In order to verify if that intuition is correct and evaluate the performance
of the above empirical approaches, we apply them to panel data over the years
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2000 to 2006 on the vehicle registration tax policies of the one-hundred Italian
provinces, where the state-wide tax rate cap was binding for about half of the
authorities in the year 2000 and up to almost 90% of them in the year 2006.
While almost entirely neglected in the empirical public economics literature,
vehicle taxation is widely employed at the decentralized level in both developed
and developing countries, and might generate spatial auto-correlation for two
reasons.3 First, as long as the tax base (motor vehicles) is mobile across juris-
dictions, local vehicle taxation might give rise to tax competition to attract tax
base and induce correlation across neighboring authorities’ policies. Second, due
to the high visibility of vehicle taxes and the widespread ownership of motor ve-
hicles, vehicle taxation can work as a signal of a government’s quality, and could
therefore foster accountability and yardstick competition between decentralized
governments (Besley and Case [4]).
The evidence from the Italian provinces’ vehicle tax data suggests that ignor-
ing tax limitations can lead to substantial underestimation of inter-jurisdictional
fiscal interaction. Explicitly allowing for the corner solutions generated by tax
limitations unveils a significantly stronger process of spatial interaction: the
Tobit model yields an estimate of the spatial auto-regressive coefficient that is
about twice as large as either the standard maximum likelihood estimate that
ignores tax limits or the Bayesian spatial censored model one, and the discrete
hazard model provides further evidence that the probability of an authority
hitting the upper censoring point is strongly affected by the fiscal choices of
neighboring authorities. These results call for a thorough rethinking of the
existing empirical evidence on spatial auto-correlation in local tax policies.
The paper devotes the next four sections to the illustration of each of the
estimation approaches in turn. Section 6 turns to their application to the Italian
provinces’ vehicle taxes, and section 7 concludes.
3Empirical analyses of decentralized vehicle taxation are Mahadi et al. [25], Suter and
Walter [38] and Solé Ollé [36].
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2 The spatial lag dependence model
Local governments around the world are frequently subject to stringent reg-
ulations on their tax and spending decisions, making the ideal paradigm of
intergovernmental competition sort of blurred in practice. A frequently encoun-
tered case is a cap (τ) on a local tax rate τ , meaning that τ ≤ τ and ideally
calling for a corner solution model accounting for clustering at the tax limit.
Scholars applying spatial econometric techniques to local government data
have typically ignored those tax limitations and modelled the tax reaction func-
tion as a spatial lag specification that takes the vector of observed local tax
policies as the continuous dependent variable:4
τ it = ρτ−it + x0itβ + εit (1)
where τ it is the tax rate set by jurisdiction i (i = 1, ...,N) in year t (t =
1, ..., T ), and ρ (with −1 < ρ < 1 to ensure spatial stationarity) is the first-
order spatial auto-regressive coefficient relating own tax rates to the spatially
weighted average of other jurisdictions’ tax rates:
τ−it =
NX
j=1
wijτ jt (2)
where wij are non-stochastic weights that formalize the arrangement of juris-
dictions in space. For instance, according to the conventional binary contiguity
criterion and upon row-normalization, wij equals 1ni if jurisdiction j is adja-
cent to jurisdiction i, and equal 0 otherwise, with ni being the number of units
sharing a border with unit i.5 Finally, εit is assumed to be independently and
identically distributed across geographical units and over time.6
4See the reviews in Brueckner [5], Allers and Elhorst [1] and Revelli [34]. More recent work
(Elhorst [13]) calls for more general and encompassing spatial specifications, that nonetheless
ignore the external constraints on local government policies.
5Clearly, alternative weighting criteria might be employed in order to reflect possibly more
involved - and not necessarily of a geographical nature - interaction processes among local
units (Revelli [34], [35]). However, the adoption of an adjacency-based criterion should suffice
for the point to be made in this paper, and can be easily extended to any weighting criterion.
6 In fact, residual spatial autocorrelation, i.e., the possibility of a spatial process in εit,
ought to be tested for before estimating the spatial lag specification (1). See Elhorst [13] and
section 6 below.
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The spatial lag dependence model can be inverted and expressed in matrix
form as:
τ = (I − ρW )−1Xβ + (I − ρW )−1 ε (3)
where I is the (NT ×NT ) identity matrix and W = [IT ⊗WN ] is the block-
diagonal, row-standardized spatial weights matrix, with WN = {wij}, i, j =
1, ...,N , and
P
j wij = 1, ∀i. Formulation (3) makes it clear that, with ρ 6= 0, a
perturbation at any location will be transmitted to all other units. By assuming
that εit ∼ N(0, σ2ε), (3) can conveniently be estimated by standard maximum
likelihood (ML) techniques (Anselin [2]).
Suppose now that central government imposes the tax limitation τ it ≤ τ ,
generating an additional constraint on local government choices, with a positive
probability that local government i is at a corner solution outcome in period
t: τ it = τ . Overlooking the fact that a number of authorities might be tax-
constrained at τ is bound to lead to similar problems as the ones that are
encountered in non-spatial econometric settings when the dependent variable is
limited (Pudney [33]). In particular, and most importantly for our purposes, the
maximum likelihood estimate of the first-order spatial auto-regressive coefficient
ρ measuring the slope of the reaction function (1) is biased. Intuitively, when
an authority hits the tax limit, its reaction function becomes flat (ρ = 0),
giving the impression of deliberately setting its tax policy independently of
other jurisdictions, while being in reality constrained by state limitations to do
so.
3 A Bayesian censored dependent variable ap-
proach
One possibility of empirically modelling a spatial process as (1)-(2) while allow-
ing for the tax limitation τ it ≤ τ consists in “estimating” in a Bayesian fashion
the tax rates that would be observed in the absence of tax limitations (LeSage
and Kelley Pace [24]). Calling τ∗it the “desired” tax rate by authority i in year
t - i.e., the tax rate that would be set in the absence of tax limitations, but that
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might be unobserved due to capping - the ultimate objective of the empirical
analysis turns out to consist in recovering the “true” slope parameter ρ in a
reaction function where desired tax rates are spatially auto-correlated:7
τ∗it = ρτ
∗
−it + x
0
itβ + εit (4)
τ∗−it =
NX
j=1
wijτ∗jt (5)
with wij being defined as in (2) above, and the observed tax rate being generated
as:
τ it =
½
τ
τ∗it
if
τ∗it ≥ τ
τ∗it < τ
(6)
In a way, model (1)-(2) is the observed, tax limited counterpart of the latent
model (4)-(5). However, by positing that spatial auto-correlation in observed
fiscal policies is originated from dependence in the latent variable τ∗, the spec-
ification (4)-(5) has a not-so-intuitive implication: since both the own tax (τ it)
and the taxes in neighboring jurisdictions (τ−it) are only observed after cap-
ping, the direction and size of the bias deriving from estimation of model (1)-(2)
instead of the true but unobserved process (4)-(5) are unknown a priori.
With −1 < ρ < 1, the matrix form of equation (4) can be inverted and
expressed as:
τ∗ = (I − ρW )−1Xβ + (I − ρW )−1 ε (7)
with variance-covariance matrix:
Ω = (I − ρW )−1 (I − ρW )−10 σ2ε (8)
The substantial difference of the latent variable model (7) with respect to
a non-spatial specification (ρ = 0) is that the spatially correlated covariance
structure (8) does not allow the simplification of the multivariate distribution
into the product of univariate distributions. Moreover, the heteroscedasticity
7The argument that is being made here relies on the assumption that observations below
the censoring point are unaffected by the existence of the tax cap. However, Konrad [22]
shows that this might not be the case in a theoretical framework of Stackelberg competition
for mobile capital, due to the strategic effect of a non-binding tax limit.
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implied by the spatial covariance structure causes inconsistency of standard non-
spatial limited dependent variable estimation methods (McMillen, [28]; Fleming
[16]).
A number of approaches have been recently proposed to consistently estimate
variants of model (7), particularly with reference to a binary dependent variable
setting (spatial Probit), and where spatial dependence typically takes the form
of a first-order autoregressive process in the residuals (Pinkse and Slade [32]):
τ∗ = Xβ + v (9)
v = λWv + ε (10)
ε ∼ N(0, I) (11)
where λ (with −1 < λ < 1) is the auto-regressive coefficient in the spatial error
process and W is as defined above.8
The proposed estimation methods for the above models either focus on the
heteroscedasticity induced by the spatial model structure and address it by
making specific assumptions on the form of the spatial weights matrix (Case
[8]) and the variance-covariance structure (Pinkse and Slade [32]), or make full
use of the spatial information and rely on computationally complex techniques
(the EM algorithm, simulation methods or Bayesian methods) to tackle the
issue of multidimensional integration (Fleming [16]).9
Within the latter class of models, the Bayesian spatial discrete choice method
developed by LeSage [23] overcomes some drawbacks that arise in the EM algo-
rithm when estimating standard errors (McMillen [28]), and has the advantage
of allowing the errors to be heteroscedastic after controlling for spatial depen-
dence. Moreover, it tends to be superior to simulation methods (Beron and
Vijverberg [3]) in terms of computational requirements and flexibility (Flem-
ing [16]). Most importantly, though, the LeSage Bayesian approach is the best
8Flores-Lagunes and Schnier [17] develop a sample selection model with spatial error de-
pendence both in the selection and in the main equation.
9Klier and McMillen [21] propose a linearized logit version of Pinkse and Slade [32] spatial
GMM estimator that can be applied to a model with a spatially lagged latent dependent
variable.
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suited to estimate a censored dependent variable model with simultaneous spa-
tial dependence as in (7) above.
The Bayesian spatial approach is based on the principle that a likelihood
function for model (7) can be formulated and optimized based on “estimates”
of the unobserved latent variable τ∗.10 In practice, the approach relies on the
actual observed τ values for uncensored observations, while estimates of the
unobserved latent variables τ∗ for censored observations are obtained through
Gibbs sampling from a distribution of the latent variable (truncated at τ) con-
ditional on all other parameters in the model.11
The idea underlying the Bayesian spatial approach is similar to the EM al-
gorithm proposed by McMillen [28], where the censored or latent unobserved
observations on the dependent variable are replaced by estimated values. Given
estimates of the missing values, the EM algorithm proceeds to estimate the other
parameters in the model using methods applied to non-truncated data samples.
In other words, conditional on the estimated values, the estimation problem is
reduced to a non-censored estimation problem that can be solved using max-
imum likelihood methods. Similarly, once a sample for the unobserved latent
dependent variables has been generated via the Gibbs sampler, the problem
reduces to a Bayesian heteroscedastic spatial auto-regressive model. Moreover,
the Bayesian spatial procedure yields the mean and dispersion of all parameters,
including the crucial spatial lag coefficient ρ.
4 A Tobit approach
A potential drawback of the spatial latent variable specification (4)-(5) con-
sists in the fact that it best applies to instances of true censoring - i.e., non-
observability of a variable above a given threshold, - while it is unlikely to
10The LeSage [23] approach is extensively discussed in Fleming [16] and LeSage and Kelley
Pace [24]. The LeSage procedure has recently been applied to a local public finance context
by Fiva and Rattso [15].
11The Gibbs sampler is an algorithm able to generate a sequence of samples from a joint
probability distribution of two (or more) random variables. It can be shown that the sequence
of samples constitutes a Markov chain, and the stationary distribution of that Markov chain
is just the sought-after joint distribution (LeSage and Kelley Pace [24]).
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capture the competition process that is at work in typical local public finance
contexts, where tax limitations produce corner solution outcomes. In the pres-
ence either of yardstick or tax competition, each jurisdiction should be supposed
to care about the actual policies enacted by its neighbors, not their (unobserved)
desired ones. As a result, the empirical specification would require the “ideal”
tax policy of each government (τ∗it) to be affected by neighboring jurisdictions’
observed tax policies (τ jt; j 6= i).
Unfortunately, though, a simultaneous dependence model where desired poli-
cies τ∗ are allowed to depend on neighbors’ contemporaneous policies is known
to be algebraically inconsistent and cannot therefore be implemented empiri-
cally (Beron and Vijverberg [3]). As a result, a reasonable way to move forward
consists in following here the spatial discrete choice approach developed by Du-
bin [11] and implemented, among the others, by Hautsch and Klotz [18], Paez
and Scott [30] and Paez et al. [30], and allowing own attitudes towards taxa-
tion (τ∗t ) to be affected by neighbors’ lagged fiscal policies (τ jt−1; j 6= i). This
implies modelling the latent tax policy as:
τ∗it = x
0
itβ + ρτ−it−1 + εit = x
0
itβ + ρ
NX
j=1
wijτ jt−1 + εit (12)
Besides depicting a realistic process by which corner solutions arise as out-
comes of fiscal externalities generated by the actual policies implemented in
nearby localities, specification (12) can also be justified by the idea that the ad-
justment to neighboring authorities’ policies does not take place instantly due to
the sluggishness of the political process. Neighboring jurisdictions’ tax policies
at time t−1 affect an authority’s tax policy at time t and, in the presence of the
tax limitation τ it ≤ τ , authority i might end up in a corner solution outcome if
τ∗it > τ .
Therefore, assuming a normal distribution for the error term in (12), a corner
solution Tobit model can be estimated, with:
τ it =
½
τ
τ∗it
if
τ∗it ≥ τ
τ∗it < τ
(13)
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In particular, in order to obtain an estimate of the degree of inter-jurisdictional
interaction that is comparable with the maximum likelihood estimate of the
spatial lag dependence model that ignores the tax limitations, we will focus on
the marginal effects based on the expected value of the tax rate conditional
on exogenous observable variables and neighbors’ tax rates (E(τ it |xit, τ−it−1 ))
and on the expected value of the tax rate for the subsample of unconstrained
authorities (E(τ it |τ it < τ, xit, τ−it−1 )).
5 A discrete hazard approach
Finally, the spatial latent variable specification (4)-(5) relies on the assumption
that, in every period, a government elaborates its optimal tax rate based on the
realizations of the observables. However, it is rarely the case in practice that
a government hitting the upper bound (the tax cap) ever reverts from there
in the future.12 As a result, it might be sensible to treat the occurrence of a
government hitting the upper bound as a discrete and irreversible event. In
order to do so, we model the event of local government i hitting the threshold
τ it = τ at some point t = 1, ..., T as a failure, and estimate the probability -
or hazard - of exiting from the inner interval (0, τ) in period t conditional on
having survived until then (Jenkins [19]).
In particular, let Ti ∈ t = {1, 2, ..., T} denote the discrete survival time of
local government i, i.e., the number of years that elapse before the government
sets the maximum tax rate. The authorities surviving until the end of the period
with τ it < τ have a (censored) duration of Ti = T . The hazard function of Ti
is the probability that Ti = t, conditional on government i not having failed in
previous periods and on a number of time-varying characteristics - the vector
xit discussed with reference to the reaction function (1) - plus a set of time
dummies capturing duration dependence. By choosing a normal distribution
for the formulation of the probability of exit, we can estimate a Probit model
where the dependent variable is binary: yit ∈ {0, 1}. Observations for which
12See section 6 below for evidence in this respect.
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the event never occurs in the period considered take value 0 in all years; when
the event occurs (yit = 1), the local government exits the sample:
yit =
½
1
0
if
τ∗it ≥ τ
τ∗it < τ
(14)
In order to ascertain whether neighboring governments’ fiscal choices affect
the probability that a government hits the upper bound, we allow τ∗it to be
defined as in (12) above. As a result, the lagged choices of neighboring jurisdic-
tions can be treated as exogenous, and the hazard model can be estimated by
standard Probit. Clearly, being the dependent variable a binary one in (14), the
estimated coefficients from the discrete hazard model - in particular, the change
in probability of hitting the tax limit following a change in the τ jt−1 variable -
will only be qualitatively comparable with the ones from the previous models.
6 The provincial vehicle tax in Italy
The Italian system of local government is organized as a three-tier structure,
with over 8,000 municipalities, 100 provinces and 20 regions.13 Provinces play
an important role in planning and coordinating municipal policies, particularly
as far as the decisions that transcend strictly municipal boundaries - such as the
control of industrial, car and heating pollution, as well as the management and
disposal of waste - are concerned. Moreover, they have exclusive responsibility
for the maintenance of intermunicipal roads, local transportation systems and
secondary education schools.
Provincial authorities fund their expenditures through grants from upper
levels of government and own tax revenues, that are mainly constituted (60%)
by the provincial vehicle registration tax. The provincial vehicle registration
tax was introduced in the year 2000 in order to reduce reliance on external
funding and to foster the accountability of administrations to their electorates.
All motor vehicles are liable to the payment of the tax the first time they are
13There also exist three “autonomous” Provinces in the upper North mountaneous bilingual
regions, with special features and competencies. Due to their peculiarities, they are not
considered in the rest of the analysis.
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registered in the provincial archive under a given owner’s name. The total tax
due is made of a lump-sum amount plus a variable component that is related to
the size, power and destination of the vehicle. Central government establishes
a lower and an upper bound on the vehicle tax parameters, with the upper
bound corresponding to a 20% higher tax burden than the one corresponding to
the lower bound. Consequently, the decision of each province basically consists
in determining autonomously the percentage tax spread (τ from here onwards,
with 0 ≤ τ ≤ 20).
Table 1 reports the average τ along with the number of provinces setting
the minimum (τ = τ = 0) and maximum (τ = τ = 20) tax spreads in each
of the seven years following its introduction (2000-2006). The table shows that
provinces steadily raised their tax spreads over time, with almost 90% of them
hitting the upper bound by the year 2006.14 A similar picture emerges from
figure 1, where the evolution of the geographical pattern of the vehicle tax during
the period under examination is depicted.
On the other hand, table 2 shows that the tax spread was raised by provin-
cial governments 113 times. Interestingly, the last column in table 2 shows that
in only four of the 113 instances the tax rise occurred in a year when a provin-
cial election was scheduled to take place, with the remaining 109 tax rises being
decided in safer non-election years.15 Furthermore, while the chances of success
of the incumbent in the overall sample exceed 75%, only 50% of the incum-
bents that raised the tax in election years managed to be re-elected, suggesting
that electoral considerations play a role in vehicle tax setting, with provincial
governments seeming to time tax increases in order to minimize their adverse
popularity consequences.16
14 Starting from 2007, the cap was raised to 30%.
15Provincial elections take place every five years, with direct popular election of the president
of the Province, typically out of four to five candidates, and the members of the provincial
Council. 3
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of the 100 Provinces held an election around the middle of the period (2003-2004),
while some Provinces had an election in the early 2000s and went again to the polls five years
later.
16This evidence must of course be taken with caution due to the very few occurrences of tax
rises in election years. In fact, the small number of observations precludes us from explicitly
estimating a re-election equation.
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In order to verify if vehicle taxes across adjacent provinces are correlated, we
start from the estimation of the spatial lag specification (1) that ignores state-
wide tax limits. The vector of time-varying explanatory variables xit includes
grants per capita, income (value added) per capita, the stock of vehicles regis-
tered in the province in the previous year, a dummy that equals 1 in election
years, a dummy that equals 1 if the government is right-wing, and the weighted
average of neighboring provinces’ tax spreads defined in equation (2). Based on
the fact that the (700× 1) vector of average neighboring provinces’ tax spreads
equals [I ⊗W ] τ , where I is the (7 × 7) identity matrix and W = {wij} is the
(100× 100) exogenous spatial weights matrix, the matrix form of equation (1)
can be inverted as in (3) and estimated by maximum likelihood techniques.17
The results of estimation of a parsimonious specification that includes no
control variables (β = 0) are reported in table 3, while table 4 reports the results
with all of the above explanatory variables included. Both specifications include
fixed province (qi) and time (zt) effects. In tables 3 and 4, the first column
reports the results of OLS estimation of a non-spatial specification (ρ = 0);
the second column reports the OLS estimates of the spatial lag specification;
the third column shows the corresponding ML results; finally, the fourth column
contains the ML estimation results of a spatial error dependence model (Anselin
[2]), where ρ = 0 and nearby provinces are allowed to be hit by spatially auto-
correlated shocks:
τ it = x0itβ + qi + zt + vit (15)
vit = λv−it + εit (16)
where, similarly to equation (2), v−it is defined as:
v−it =
100X
j=1
wijvjt (17)
The tests for spatial auto-correlation in column (a) of table 3 and column
(e) of table 4 point rather consistently towards positive spatial auto-correlation
17The likelihood function is maximized via the MAXLIK procedure in GAUSS.
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in the residuals of a non-spatial specification.18 In the fully specified equation,
the LM (Lagrange Multiplier) tests tend to favour the spatial lag dependence
model over the spatial error dependence one.19
The parsimonious specification in table 3 yields an OLS estimate of the spa-
tial auto-correlation coefficient ρ of about 0.20, and an ML estimate of 0.12.
After controlling for a number of exogenous local characteristics (table 4), ev-
idence of spatial dependence in τ dwindles. While the (upward biased) OLS
estimate of ρ in column (f) is 0.135, the ML estimate of ρ in column (g) of
table 4 is an admittedly not overwhelming and only marginally significant value
of 0.08, pointing towards a pretty flat reaction function. However, as argued
above, this is what one could expect given the tax limitation on the dependent
variable, and bρML might be suffering from a downward bias. As for the other
variables, right-wing ideology, proximity to elections, per capita income and
grants from upper levels of government all tend to be associated with lower tax
rates, and the stock of vehicles circulating in the province has a positive effect
on the provincial tax rate.
Table 5, columns (i) and (j), reports the estimation results of the Bayesian
spatial model.20 The estimate of the spatial auto-correlation coefficient is 0.15
and is highly significant in the basic specification with β = 0, while it is around
0.10 when the effect of the explanatory variables is accounted for. Overall, the
results from the Bayesian spatial model based on (4)-(5) provide a very similar
picture as the spatial lag specification that ignores censoring. Moreover, the
coefficient estimates on the other explanatory variables are similar in the two
models.
Table 6 reports the corner solution Tobit and discrete hazard estimates.
18The Moran test is asymptotycally distributed as a standard normal under the null hy-
pothesis of absence of spatial auto-correlation, while the LM tests against the hypotheses of
a spatial lag - model (1) - or a spatial error - model (15)-(16) - are both distributed as χ2(1)
(Anselin [2]). All tests are performed in GAUSS.
19Clearly, the two LM tests take on the same value in table 3, where no exogenous variables
are included, since the spatial lag and spatial error models are indistinguishable in that case,
as shown by the ML estimation results in columns (c) and (d).
20Estimation is performed in Matlab based on the routines for a spatial auto-regressive
censored dependent variable model (sart_g function) provided by James LeSage (www.spatial-
econometrics.com).
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Column (k) in table 6 reports the Tobit partial effects computed at the sample
mean E(τ it |xit, τ−it−1 ). Strikingly, the estimate of the effect of neighbors’ tax
rates on the own tax rate is almost twice as large as the ML estimate of ρ and
it is highly significant, and it is even higher in column (l), when the partial
effect ∂E(τit|τ it<τ,xit,τ−it−1 )∂τ−it−1 is computed conditional on τ it < τ , suggesting
that ignoring the corner solutions generated by tax limitations might lead to
substantial underestimation of the local interaction process.
Finally, column (m) in table 6 reports the discrete hazard model results.
Since the 2000 cross-section is lost in taking the lag of neighboring provinces’
tax rates and due to the fact that provinces leave the sample when hitting the
upper bound, estimation is performed on an unbalanced panel data set of 150
observations, 32 of which reach the τ limit over the years 2001 to 2006.
Reported coefficients are partial probability effects computed at the sample
means. Partial effects for dummy variables are computed as the change in
probability when a dummy variable shifts from 0 to 1, so that, for instance, the
probability that a right-wing government hits the upper threshold is over ten
percentage points lower than it is for a left-wing government. The coefficient on
the election year dummy has a similar size, but it is not statistically significant,
and there is no significant evidence of duration dependence.
As far as the effect of lagged neighboring provinces’ tax policies is con-
cerned, an increase by 2 percentage points in the average tax rate of neighboring
provinces is estimated to raise the probability of a province hitting the upper
bound τ in the subsequent year by around 3 percentage points. This means
that, for instance, an “average” left-wing government elected in year 2000 has
an around 20% probability of hitting the tax limit in 2001 (the second year in
the sample) if neighboring authorities were setting a zero tax spread in 2000³PN
j=1wijτ jt−1 = 0
´
, while the probability jumps to about 50% if all adjacent
provinces were capped in year 2000
³PN
j=1wijτ jt−1 = 20
´
.
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7 Concluding remarks
The empirical tax and yardstick competition literature that has grown impres-
sively in the past two decades relies on the implicit and universal assumption
that decentralized governments are free to set their tax policy instruments.
However, local governments around the globe are hardly ever able to implement
the policies they deem fit. In most instances, they are constrained by central
government mandates on public expenditures or caps on local taxes.
This paper has explored for the first time the consequences of central capping
on the modelling and estimation of a local fiscal policy reaction function. By
means of an empirical application to provincial vehicle taxation in Italy, we have
employed four empirical approaches to the estimation of the inter-jurisdictional
spatial interaction coefficient in the frequently encountered case of central gov-
ernment exercising its command by imposing upper limits on local fiscal choices.
It turns out that explicitly allowing for the corner solutions generated by
tax limitations unveils a significantly stronger process of spatial interaction than
when employing conventional approaches: the Tobit model yields an estimate of
the spatial auto-regressive coefficient that is around twice as large as either the
standard maximum likelihood estimate that ignores tax limits or the Bayesian
spatial censored model one, and the discrete hazard model provides further
evidence that the probability of an authority hitting the upper censoring point is
strongly and significantly affected by the fiscal choices of neighboring authorities.
While this paper represents just the first, tentative step into the investiga-
tion of the impact of top-down tax limitations on horizontal tax competition,
and the evidence presented here should be taken as no more than illustrative,
explicit recognition of the fact that local governments are “creatures of state
governments” (Calabrese and Epple [7]) seems to call for a thorough rethinking
of the existing empirical evidence on strategic interaction in local fiscal policies.
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Table 1 The provincial vehicle registration tax: key statistics
Average τ τ t=τ τ t=τ τ t=τ |τ t−1 < τ
2000 11.9 31 56 56
2001 14.5 19 68 12
2002 16.5 9 79 11
2003 16.7 8 80 1
2004 16.9 8 81 1
2005 17.6 6 86 5
2006 18 4 88 2
2000-2006 16.5
Notes: 100 Provinces; τ is the provincial vehicle registration tax rate spread. τ and
τ are the lower (0%) and upper (20%) bounds set by central government respectively.
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Table 2 Vehicle tax policy and provincial elections
el = 1 ∆τ > 0 ∆τ > 0 & el = 1
2000 6 69 2
2001 9 14 0
2002 10 15 1
2003 12 2 1
2004 63 3 0
2005 6 7 0
2006 13 3 0
2000-2006 119 113 4
% re-elected 76.5 50
Notes: 100 Provinces; el = 1 in year t if a provincial election is held in that year.
∆τ = τ t−τ t−1 is the change in the provincial vehicle registration tax spread τ from
year t− 1 to year t. Setting a positive tax in year 2000 (the year of introduction of
the provincial vehicle tax) is treated as a tax increase.
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Table 3 Vehicle tax spread determination: baseline linear specification
(a) (b) (c) (d)
ML OLS ML ML
constant
-4.224***
(0.373)
-3.281***
(0.464)
-3.658***
(0.429)
-4.161***
(0.422)
ρ
0.201***
(0.060)
0.121***
(0.047)
λ
0.121***
(0.047)
Fixed province effects yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood -1914.49 -1911.21 -1911.21
Observations 700 700 700 700
Moran test
(p value)
3.358
(0.001)
LM lag test
(p value)
8.628
(0.003)
LM error test
(p value)
8.628
(0.003)
LR test
(p value)
6.552
(0.010)
6.552
(0.010)
Notes: dep. var. = provincial tax spread (0 ≤ τ ≤ 20); standard errors in paren-
theses; *, **, *** (p-value < 0.10, 0.05, 0.01).
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Table 4 Vehicle tax spread determination: full linear specification
(e) (f) (g) (h)
ML OLS ML ML
constant
-5.053***
(0.505)
-4.296***
(0.612)
-4.606***
(0.567)
-4.965***
(0.531)
election dummyit
-0.641
(0.443)
-0.580
(0.436)
-0.605
(0.428)
-0.632
(0.447)
grantsit
-2.966***
(0.729)
-2.630***
(0.743)
-2.769***
(0.733)
-2.790***
(0.757)
incomeit−1
-0.446*
(0.244)
-0.417*
(0.245)
-0.429*
(0.247)
-0.435*
(0.245)
stock of vehiclesit−1
1.774**
(0.718)
1.728**
(0.714)
1.747**
(0.717)
1.751**
(0.716)
right-wing dummyit−1
-0.575
(0.866)
-0.481
(0.826)
-0.519
(0.825)
-0.502
(0.830)
ρ
0.135**
(0.061)
0.080*
(0.047)
λ
0.062
(0.048)
Fixed province effects yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood -1898.87 -1897.45 -1898.08
Observations 700 700 700 700
Moran test
(p value)
1.882
(0.060)
LM lag test
(p value)
3.690
(0.055)
LM error test
(p value)
2.019
(0.155)
LR test
(p value)
2.840
(0.091)
1.570
(0.210)
Notes: dep. var. = provincial tax spread (0 ≤ τ ≤ 20); standard errors in paren-
theses; *, **, *** (p-value < 0.10, 0.05, 0.01); time effects included.
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Table 5 Vehicle tax spread determination: Bayesian model
(i) (j)
election dummyit
-0.609
(0.810)
grantsit
-1.245**
(0.643)
incomeit−1
0.231***
(0.056)
stock of vehiclesit−1
-0.645***
(0.064)
right-wing dummyit−1
-2.589***
(0.599)
ρ
0.153***
(0.051)
0.098**
(0.050)
year 2001
12.132***
(1.023)
12.985***
(1.510)
year 2002
14.231***
(1.134)
15.526***
(1.609)
year 2003
14.443***
(1.108)
15.860***
(1.625)
year 2004
14.575***
(1.171)
16.169***
(1.669)
year 2005
15.242***
(1.203)
16.458***
(1.596)
year 2006
15.626***
(1.199)
16.774***
(1.585)
Observations 700 700
Right-censored
(τ it=τ)
538 538
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** (p-value < 0.10, 0.05, 0.01).
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Table 6 Vehicle tax spread determination: Tobit and hazard models
(k) (l) (m)
Tobit hazard (Probit)
election dummyit
-0.047
(0.551)
-0.056
(0.649)
-0.100
(0.078)
grantsit
0.002
(0.005)
0.002
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.001)
incomeit−1
0.043
(0.038)
0.051
(0.045)
-0.017***
(0.006)
stock of vehiclesit−1
-2.335***
(0.379)
-2.774***
(0.418)
-0.030
(0.051)
right-wing dummyit−1
-1.864***
(0.502)
-2.062***
(0.518)
-0.109*
(0.070)
∂E(τit|xit,τ−it−1 )
∂τ−it−1
0.152***
(0.047)
∂E(τit|τ it<τ,xit,τ−it−1 )
∂τ−it−1
0.180***
(0.055)
∂P (τ it=τ)
∂τ−it−1
0.015**
(0.007)
year 2002
-0.791
(0.891)
-0.880
(0.932)
0.371**
(0.197)
year 2003
0.130
(0.679)
0.157
(0.827)
0.438**
(0.206)
year 2004
-0.148
(0.719)
-0.173
(0.832)
0.006
(0.178)
year 2005
0.436
(0.632)
0.542
(0.821)
0.338*
(0.234)
year 2006
0.614
(0.599)
0.777
(0.811)
0.173
(0.237)
Observations 600 600 150
corner solutions
(τ it= 20)
482 482 32
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** (p-value < 0.10, 0.05, 0.01).
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Appendix
Table A1 Variables used in the analysis: descriptive statistics
obs. mean s.d. min max
Spatial lag dependence, censored, Tobit models
Vehicle tax spread (%) 700 16.5 6.9 0 20
Stock of vehicles (,000) 700 426.9 486.1 57.1 3514.2
Newly registered vehicles (,000) 700 31.4 50.5 3.1 471.2
Income (value added per capita; ,000 €) 700 20.1 5.0 10.8 34.3
Current spending per capita (€) 700 155.4 50.8 55.6 327.3
Grants per capita (€) 700 93.8 49.0 3.5 243.2
Right-wing control (%) 700 36
Discrete hazard model
Vehicle tax spread (%) 150 8.9 8.0 0 20
Stock of vehicles (,000) 150 704.5 822.0 59.5 3383.1
Newly registered vehicles (,000) 150 56.6 86.5 3.2 414.6
Income (value added per capita; ,000 €) 150 19.7 6.1 10.9 34.3
Current spending per capita (€) 150 136.0 40.8 69.7 251.3
Grants per capita (€) 150 79.9 44.8 11.9 196.7
Right-wing control (%) 150 55
Table A2 Variables used in the analysis: data sources
source years
Vehicle tax Automobile Club Italy - Quattroruote 2000-2006
Stock of vehicles Public Registry of Vehicles 1999-2006
Vehicle registrations Public Registry of Vehicles 1999-2006
Income National Statistics Institute 1999-2005
Current spending Italian Government, Home Office 2000-2006
Grants Italian Government, Home Office 2000-2006
Right-wing control Italian Government, Home Office 1999-2006
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Figure 1: Vehicle tax spatial pattern
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